POSITIONS 2002- : Full Professor of Economics, University of Siena 1997-1998: By-Fellow, Churchill College Cambridge U.K. 1992-2002: Associate Professor of Economics , University of Siena 1991: Visiting Lecturer, Department of Economics, Georgetown University Washington D.C. 1988: Visiting Scholar, Faculty of Economics and Politics, University of Cambridge U.K. 1983-1992: Assistant Professor, University of Siena 1980-1982: Research Scholar at Fondazione L.Einaudi , Turin EDUCATION ‘Laurea’ degree in Philosophy (University of Pisa, 1978), Diploma di Licenza in Filosofia of Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa and ‘Perfezionamento’ Postgraduate degree (University of Urbino, 1981). RESEARCH FIELDS Coalitional Game Theory. Structure and Algebraic Classifications of Game Form. Applications of Game Forms in Social Choice and Distributed Cryptography. Majorization in combinatorial settings.

• Dominance dimension: a common parametric formulation for integer-valued scientific impact indices, Scientometrics (2010) 84: 43-48
• On the volume-ranking of opportunity sets in economic environments (with E.Savaglio), Social Choice and Welfare (2009) 33: 1-24
• The proportional lottery protocol is strongly β-participatory and VNM-strategy-proof, International Game Theory Review (2008) 10: 195-203
• A coalitional game-theoretic model of stable government forms with umpires, Review of Economic Design (2008) 12: 33-44
• Game formats as Chu spaces, International Game Theory Review (2007) 9: 119-138
• Filtral preorders and opportunity inequality (with E. Savaglio), Journal of Economic Theory (2007) 132: 474-492
• Effectivity functions and stable governance structures, Annals of Operations Research (2002) 109: 99-127
• Voting for a coalition government: a game-theoretic view, European Journal of Political Economy (1997) 13: 537-555